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Military engineers from the U.S. Naval Construction Task Group -- commonly referred to as Seabees -- have begun reconstructing the Sumisip Highway, a road connecting six towns and the capital city of the southern Philippine island of Basilan. The construction is part of the joint U.S.-Philippine counterterrorism training exercise in the south known as Balikatan 02-1. More than 1,000 U.S. troops are participating in the exercise directed against the militant Muslim group Abu Sayyaf, which is linked to al Qaeda and blamed for several kidnappings and bombings in the Philippines.

U.S. participation in Balikatan has been dubbed the opening of the second front in the war against terrorism. Yet the Abu Sayyaf represents only a limited threat to the United States. The real reason for the exercises is may be evidenced by the U.S. infrastructure development in Basilan, where factions of the rebel group maintain their base of operations.

Although the U.S. government is characterizing the development work as an effort to reduce poverty in the region and thus eliminate one of the root causes of terrorism, Washington may be literally paving the way for a forward logistics and operations base to conduct regional counterterrorism strikes.

The U.S. presence in the Philippines, which began when American troops were deployed in January to provide assistance and training to Filipino forces, has stirred controversy in the country. Politicians debated the constitutionality of the deployment and especially whether U.S. soldiers would engage in combat operations. It was only after being carefully constrained in size and scope that the Balikatan exercise cleared the legal and political hurdles in Manila.

U.S. participation was initially limited to 660 personnel, of which just 160 -- organized into 12-man Special Forces teams -- would be with Philippine troops in the field on Basilan. The remaining support and training staff would be relegated to operating around the southern city of Zamboanga on nearby Mindanao and to a support base on Mactan Island near Cebu.

Through extensions and modifications to the initial terms, the total U.S. deployment now exceeds 1,000, comprising 160 Special Forces and 340 Seabees and Marine guards on Basilan, 440 support and training staff near Zamboanga and as many as 300 aviation, logistics and intelligence personnel on Mactan. The U.S. forces are joined by nearly 4,000 Philippine troops who are engaged in tracking down and destroying the Abu Sayyaf and freeing three hostages -- including two Americans -- the group still holds.

The initial U.S. participation was likely triggered by the numerous reports of links between the Abu Sayyaf and al Qaeda. Several key Abu Sayyaf members allegedly trained in Afghanistan and participated in planning sessions to assassinate the Pope and crash hijacked airliners into the ocean. Abu Sayyaf also demanded the release of convicted World Trade Center bomber Ramsi Youseff in return for the release of several hostages.

Yet the links between Abu Sayyaf and al Qaeda operatives have faded over the past few years, particularly as the former began straying from being an ideological separatist cell to a collection of semi-autonomous kidnap-for-ransom gangs. Destroying the Abu Sayyaf then will accomplish little in Washington’s fight against international terrorism and al Qaeda, particularly because Abu Sayyaf operates almost exclusively inside the Philippines and is nearly isolated to Basilan. But the continued, and even expanded, U.S. presence on Basilan demonstrates a second layer to Washington’s operations in the Philippines.

Basilan is far from Manila, and if it weren’t for the Abu Sayyaf, it would be an island of little note. Yet its location is strategic if the United States wants to establish a forward logistics and operations base in Southeast Asia. Despite the political bickering in Manila, the Philippines is a focal point for U.S. operations in the region due to Washington’s close relationship with the government and the country’s proximity to Malaysia and, more importantly, Indonesia.

Indonesia, like Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, would be a very attractive location for al Qaeda to regroup, due to the massive Muslim population, limited central control and the underlying sympathies of some influential political and military figures. These same features also make U.S. cooperation and anti-terrorism operations in Indonesia extremely difficult. That is why it is important for the United States to set up an operations facility outside Indonesia but close enough for action.

U.S. military planners have looked at the city of General Santos in southern Mindanao as an ideal location for facilities, with both sea and land access. After the Philippine government decided not to renew the U.S. lease on the Subic Naval Base in 1991, Washington’s chances of re-establishing a new facility in the Philippines were seen as extremely slim. Then came the global war against terrorism. The presence of Abu Sayyaf provided the perfect reason to return with minimal political backlash, and that directed Washington to Basilan as an alternative to General Santos.

In many respects, Basilan has several benefits over General Santos, most notably its small size. An opposing force would find it difficult to mass for an attack on the facilities, so the defending U.S. and Philippine troop numbers could be smaller. Furthermore, General Santos has a very busy port, offering cover to potential terrorists or other aggressors. And Basilan’s built-in insurgency provides a convenient political cover for the establishment of a more permanent U.S. presence on the island.

Although the political debate in Manila has yet to be quieted, the United States is well on its way to creating a conducive environment in Basilan for a forward operations base. The Seabees are repairing the main road around the island, upgrading other roads and improving two airstrips and pier facilities -- all changes that will make the island much more useful for U.S. troops to operate from. U.S. forces involved in the separate but simultaneous Balikatan 02-2 exercises on the main northern island of Luzon are training in jungle warfare and survival techniques, useful for other places in Southeast Asia.

The Abu Sayyaf problem offers a rhetorical cover for U.S. activity in the Philippines, avoiding or at least postponing the politically volatile issue of a more permanent U.S. base in its former colony. Ultimately, U.S. operations in the southern Philippines are directed less at defeating the Abu Sayyaf and more at establishing a forward operation base in Southeast Asia -- with an eye on Indonesia as a likely first target.

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Date Added: Monday, July 8th, 2002
Contributed by: RCN Administrator