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Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf announced several constitutional changes Aug. 21 intended to strengthen his powers and solidify his role in the government for the next five years. Among the key changes was the restoration of the president’s power to dissolve Parliament, and the formation of a National Security Council, which in effect gives Musharraf both civilian and military control over the country. Other changes included alterations to the election process, lowering of the voting age and the reserving of parliamentary seats for women and non-Muslim Pakistanis.

During his announcement Musharraf himself admitted that some aspects of the constitutional reforms were unpopular, in particular the formation of the NSC, but added that he thought the security council was "very important, and [its establishment] will be done." This apparent confidence in his power, however, is not entirely unshakeable. Musharraf still faces several domestic political and economic challenges, not the least of which is opposition to his cooperation in the U.S. war against terrorism.

But the president has come to an arrangement with the key pillars of Pakistani power and remains fairly secure in his position, even though he is somewhat constrained in his options when it comes to his participation in the U.S.-led hunt for al Qaeda and Taliban militants. These constraints will remain a source of friction in his relations with Washington, but the more immediate threat to the Pakistani regime may come from Musharraf’s own efforts to centralize his power, as his government would quickly collapse were he removed from the scene.

Musharraf has been simultaneously praised and criticized by U.S. military and government officials over his assistance in the war against terrorism. On one hand, the president was quick to allow Washington to station aircraft inside the country for operations against traditional Pakistani ally Afghanistan. Yet more recently, U.S. forces have expressed frustration at limitations placed on their activities in the Pakistani border areas as they search for al Qaeda and Taliban operatives.

In recent days this latter problem has led to a sort of war of words, as U.S. military commanders complain that their limited access to Pakistan is allowing al Qaeda operatives to escape, while Musharraf claims that al Qaeda and the Taliban are regrouping inside Afghanistan, with only a small number moving in and out of his country. U.S. intelligence and security forces do operate inside Pakistan’s tribal belt along the border with Afghanistan, but Musharraf wants to keep such operations low-key to avoid damaging the delicate balance he has struck with tribal leaders in the area.

Such a balancing act forms the core of both Musharraf’s stability and his limitations. In order to shore up power and retain some sense of order in Pakistan, Musharraf has struck deals with various factions and pillars of Pakistani society, as well as the United States. But this maneuvering must be carefully managed and balanced, as many of these factions are competitors. This in turn limits the amount of overt cooperation Musharraf can give U.S. forces in the region -- though these limitations are not altogether contrary to his own desires anyway.

Musharraf has offered tribal leaders free rein in their own areas and has promised to minimize the U.S. presence there in return for not siding with Taliban or al Qaeda forces. This does not necessarily mean he expects these leaders to fight against these forces themselves, just to not back them. This "positive neutrality" allows the tribal leaders to retain their autonomy while discouraging a large-scale re-formation of the Taliban or al Qaeda inside Pakistan. And as many tribal leaders have pointed out, they never really liked the Arabs al Qaeda brought into Afghanistan anyway.

Beyond the tribal leaders, Musharraf also is working with the broader Pushtun community. Ethnic Pushtuns represent one of three key pillars of Pakistani society and power, along with the Punjabis and the Mohajirs, of which Musharraf is one. Pushtuns are a credible force and are heavily represented in the army, the special forces and the Inter Services Intelligence Agency. In return for their support and loyalty, Musharraf has promoted several Pushtuns in the military over the past six months and limited the amount of direct U.S. activities inside Pakistan.

But the Pushtuns are not the only ones receiving rewards. Musharraf is also ensuring that the Punjabis, who are represented primarily in the army and air force, get higher positions of power in the military. According to Pakistani diplomatic sources in Europe, Musharraf has arranged for the promotion of Pushtuns and Punjabis in the military at the expense of the Mohajirs because he is less worried about a backlash from his own ethnic group than the others.

In addition to military perks, Musharraf also is using economic leverage to balance power among the main ethnic groups and retain his hold over all of them. While he approved a series of politically motivated anti-corruption campaigns early in his tenure, Musharraf has refrained from launching too many attacks on the key business interests of the Punjabis or the Mohajirs. These groups are also somewhat pro-Western in their outlook. They want to retain international business ties, so their interests coincide to some degree with Musharraf’s.

According to Pakistani diplomatic sources in Europe, Musharraf struck a deal with the Punjab and Mohajir elite to not attack their business interests if they supported him politically. He also warned both groups that should he be removed, the country would fall to chaos -- with possibly the Islamists taking power -- and their businesses would be ruined.

Now Musharraf is balancing the interests of all three ethnic groups, promising the Mohajirs that, as long as he is in power, their interests are secure, while at the same time telling the Punjabis and Pushtuns that he is giving them more power in the military and business community. But the balance is based on Musharraf’s personal strength and his own ability to juggle all of these interests. This presents an inherent weakness in his regime, one that will remain largely in the background as long as Musharraf is in power.

While the president has the strategic advantage inside Pakistan, he is still vulnerable to tactical threats stemming from the ongoing war against terrorism. Musharraf still has to work with Washington, which is coming to an understanding that Islamabad can only cooperate to a certain extent. But U.S. tactical commanders, particularly those in the field in southern and eastern Afghanistan, are less satisfied with the level of Musharraf’s cooperation.

In order to release U.S. pressure, Musharraf has recently launched another militant crackdown in Karachi, though mostly at the expense of the small Sindh and Shia communities. In addition, he keeps reminding Washington of the potential threat of a popular uprising in the country if he goes too far in trying to rein in militants. There have been at least three reported attempts on Musharraf’s life recently, including by three men who were captured by police in Karachi last month and who allegedly confessed to plotting to kill the president in April.

However, some if not all the reports likely were overblown to keep U.S. pressure at bay. But at least in Washington, the message is clear: Musharraf’s partial cooperation is better than the collapse of his regime, so he should not be pushed too far.

But the assassination attempts, whether real or exaggerated, do reveal the biggest potential threat to the Musharraf regime -- an attack on the president himself. While there are several Islamic militant groups in Pakistan opposed to his cooperation with the United States, they have mostly expressed that frustration through attacks on foreigners, such as a car-bomb attack outside the U.S. consulate in June. This violence is likely to intensify in the coming months, as the militants seek to score some victories to maintain support for their cause.

But were the militant Islamists to refocus their attacks toward Musharraf, it could throw off the current balance of power in Pakistan. Without the president, the competing elite would no longer retain their current alliance, as each ethnic faction would seek to replace the president with one of their own. With Punjabis, Pushtuns and Mohajirs all strongly represented in the military and the intelligence services, the chances are quite high that another military coup, similar to the one that brought Musharraf to power in 1999, could occur if the president is killed. But with no ethnic group entirely dominant, it could also trigger significant infighting within the military.

In the near term -- over the next six months to a year -- Musharraf will be relatively secure. While frustrated, the United States is largely content with what Musharraf has done within his capabilities, and the Bush administration will work with Islamabad to increase intelligence sharing and targeted tactical operations. While he may not be doing everything Washington wants, he is preventing Pakistan from degrading into internal chaos -- which serves U.S. strategic goals, at least for now.

The biggest wildcard is the potential for assassination, but Musharraf still has a competent security force. Also, the overall support for militant Islamists remains relatively low inside Pakistan and the secular Muslims still hold the military and financial power.

In the longer term, however, there are other threats to Musharraf. U.S. patience with him could run thin should another major terrorist attack take place, and pent up anger inside Pakistan could explode if U.S. forces remain for too long. Further, if Musharraf cannot get the economy back on line, he risks alienating many of the nation’s elite, as well as seeing an erosion of support from the middle class. And India always looms as a potential threat, though Musharraf already has demonstrated the ability to weather tensions with New Delhi.

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Date Added: Tuesday, August 6th, 2002
Contributed by: RCN Administrator