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South Korean President-elect Roh Moo Hyun has urged Washington to become more involved with North Korea -- where the regime is refusing talks with the United States until Washington agrees to sign a non-aggression pact. As tensions mount, diplomats and officials from China, Japan and Russia also are weighing in, driven by their own national interests.

In reviewing the actions and interests of each of the major players, it becomes evident that, as in 1993, a resolution to the current nuclear crisis still might be some time away.

Finding an answer to the North Korean riddle is made more difficult by the sheer number of players at the table. In addition to the two Koreas and the United States, China, Russia and Japan each are demanding a central role in any resolution, and several other nations and organizations are making an effort to add their two cents’ worth. Further confusing the issue is the ongoing U.S. military buildup near Iraq and the continuing international war against terrorism.

In some sense, these latter two issues have hardened North Korea’s obstinacy. Though Pyongyang has spent several years preparing for a carefully orchestrated crisis with the United States in the year 2003, the war against terrorism and Washington’s resolve to prove a military point in Iraq have left Pyongyang feeling even more vulnerable than usual.

The North Korean Strategy

For nearly two years, Pyongyang has been broadcasting -- through unofficial and semi-official channels -- its plans to use this symbolic year, the 50th anniversary of the armistice that ended the Korean War, to force the United States into redefining its relations with North Korea. Capitalizing on the end of its self-imposed missile moratorium and the fact that the two light-water nuclear reactors promised under the 1994 Agreed Framework would not be completed by the 2003 target date, officials in Pyongyang hoped to force Washington into granting North Korea formal diplomatic recognition.

From Pyongyang’s point of view, Washington’s fear of a nuclear-armed North Korea with long-range missile capabilities would be enough to get the White House to accede to the need to treat North Korea as functional member of the international community, rather than as a rogue state. Then North Korea could be more confident in its security, since it would be more difficult for Washington to attack a nation with which it had formal diplomatic relations. And for Pyongyang, the issue is all about security: North Korea’s million-man army and even its missile arsenal are no match for the technological superiority of the U.S. military, and Pyongyang always has suspected that the United States is simply waiting for the perfect opportunity to attack the modern-day Hermit Kingdom.

North Korea’s leaders initially were optimistic about the election of U.S. President George W. Bush, despite Pyongyang’s vitriolic press releases denouncing the new occupant of the White House. At the time, sources close to Pyongyang told Stratfor that North Korea knew quite well how to deal with a hawk. Less than a decade earlier, President Bill Clinton had taken office with a similar hard line toward North Korea and -- after a series of nuclear crises -- Clinton completely reversed his course, sending then-Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to Pyongyang and reportedly even considering such a trip for himself. If Clinton could shift that far, Bush could be coerced to go even farther.

But the Sept. 11 attacks on the United States changed Pyongyang’s calculations about Bush. North Korea was quick to soften its rhetoric after the attacks, and it even made some symbolic gestures aimed at reducing tensions with Washington and its allies. But Bush’s January 2002 "axis of evil" speech, and the subsequent U.S. drive toward military action in Iraq, convinced the regime in Pyongyang that at best, it was third on the U.S. military hit-list, trailing only Iraq and Iran. This impression was further enhanced by Washington’s clarified nuclear policy, with media reports placing North Korea on the short list of countries against which Washington was prepared to use nuclear weapons.

For North Korea, then, what had begun as preparation for a meticulously planned confrontation with Washington turned into a much more serious struggle for survival. Regardless of the accuracy of its perceptions, Pyongyang has little doubt that the Bush administration intends to carry out at least limited military strikes against North Korea before the 2004 elections.

Renewed talk of a non-aggression treaty, then, is not simply a bargaining ploy but a very real request for assurance that Washington will not strike. And while Pyongyang is cognizant of the fact that the Bush administration already has walked out of several international treaties since the president took office, North Korean leaders are confident that international pressure -- particularly from U.S. allies in Northeast Asia -- could stay Washington’s hand should the administration try to back out of a pact with North Korea.

The Chinese Calculus

Pyongyang is not alone in its current actions. According to Russian and Chinese diplomatic sources, Beijing encouraged the strategy but restrained North Korea’s actions. Relations between Beijing and Pyongyang have been strained for months, but China remains the closest thing to an ally that North Korea has, and Pyongyang made clear to the Chinese regime its plans to confront the United States. Leaders in Beijing did not tell Pyongyang what to do, but they did express their "understanding" of North Korea’s position.

For China, North Korea’s actions are a mixed blessing. On the negative side, if Pyongyang plays its hand badly, then the results could be catastrophic for China and all of Northeast Asia. Pyongyang has misread the Bush administration since the beginning of the war against terrorism, underestimating the White House’s resolve to eliminate all potential threats -- while counting on Washington’s fear of rogue nuclear missiles to persuade the United States to reverse its North Korea policy. Though Washington acknowledges that -- should U.S. forces carry out pre-emptive strikes against North Korea’s WMD facilities -- Pyongyang’s immediate military reaction would be devastating to Seoul, Beijing knows the U.S. administration is carefully weighing that cost against the potential damage of allowing North Korea to carry on unabated with WMD programs.

But Beijing supports North Korea’s actions (if not entirely) because they distract Washington as it prepares for war with Iraq -- a war Beijing would like to prevent, or at least delay. A swift U.S. victory over Iraq would place a significant portion of Middle Eastern oil directly under U.S. control, threatening China’s ability to satiate its ever-increasing need for imported oil and gas. China, therefore, led the initial U.N. Security Council debate on Iraq that led to the deployment of weapons inspectors: Beijing hoped the United Nations could regain control over the issue and keep Washington in line.

With the United States obviously paying little heed to the ongoing U.N. process, Beijing sees Pyongyang’s current actions as a necessary evil: Pyongyang’s strategy splits Washington’s attention and raises the specter of two simultaneous wars, something the U.S. military may not have the bandwidth to pursue effectively. And even if the North Korean crisis doesn’t prevent a war in Iraq, Beijing at least can gain some political capital as a result of the tensions, using Pyongyang to expose what Beijing considers the hypocrisy of the United States’ WMD policy.

In addition, China is positioning itself as the only viable mediator of the current standoff. Beijing has offered to host talks between Pyongyang and Washington, but isn’t rushing them -- after all, the 1993 nuclear crisis wasn’t resolved until late 1994, so there is plenty of time. Beijing is trying to reposition China as another great power, one that deserves the attention and respect of the United States and the rest of the world. But the world’s attention to China has diminished considerably since the Sept. 11 attacks, and taking charge of the North Korean issue might regain some of China’s political clout.

Russia: In The Cold?

Beijing’s deep involvement in the issue has left Moscow feeling slighted. Russian diplomatic sources told Stratfor that as the North Korean nuclear crisis was emerging, Moscow suggested to Beijing that the two nations cooperate on a solution -- and thus demonstrate their joint strength to the United States and the world. Beijing refused, since it did not need Russia’s help and had little interest in letting Moscow profit from the building crisis.

Despite a Jan. 17 visit to Beijing by Russia’s designated North Korean negotiator, Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Losyukov, Russia and China are not cooperating closely on North Korea, but rather competing for U.S. attention. Russian President Vladimir Putin was offended by the lack of international interest in a role for Moscow in the current crisis, according to sources. Leaders in Moscow expressed their unwillingness to offer Russian services unless asked, but secretly were desperate for Washington to come and ask. When Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi came to Moscow and asked for Russian assistance, Moscow jumped at the chance.

Like Beijing, Moscow sees the North Korean nuclear issue as a perfect opportunity to prove its worth to the United States and the international community, as well as to delay or disrupt Washington’s war plans in Iraq. Yet while China’s influence in North Korea is strained, Russia’s has slipped even further because Moscow spent the past few years focusing on its western flanks and leaving its far-eastern sphere of influence to wither away. It is this lost ground that Moscow wants to regain, particularly because it sees South Korea and Japan as potential economic allies ready to rebuild and strengthen Russia’s far east.

Japan and South Korea: Feeling the Heat

And despite Russia’s weakened influence in North Korea, Japan is happy to involve Moscow in order to counterbalance China’s involvement. Tokyo is concerned that a Chinese-brokered solution would give too much power to Beijing, threatening Japan’s already tenuous grasp on economic superiority in East Asia. And Tokyo is not entirely confident with Washington’s approach either.

Japan wants to ensure that it has a say in the final outcome of negotiations regarding North Korea, since Tokyo is wary of an eventually reunified Korea emerging as a serious regional economic and political competitor. And, while the United States is thousands of miles away, Japan is well within range of North Korea’s medium-range No Dong missiles.

Like Tokyo, Seoul fears that Washington’s distance from the problem gives the U.S. administration a different, and dangerous, perspective. While North Korea’s stock of long-range Taepo Dong missiles is extremely small -- and the accuracy of those missiles is questionable -- Pyongyang’s No Dongs easily could hit any spot in South Korea.

Moreover, though the semi-official number of North Korean nuclear devices repeated by U.S. and South Korean officials is one to three, Russian military sources suggest the real number is more like two to five operational warheads, with a weapons-grade plutonium stock sufficient to build another 60 bombs. Russian sources believe North Korea’s No Dongs are even more accurate than Japan’s recent estimation of 2 kilometers. Instead, Moscow says the missiles now can strike within 0.5 km to 1 km of their targets -- plenty close for a nuclear warhead.

Despite the involvement and intervention of South Korea, Japan, China and Russia, North Korea has only one negotiating partner in mind: the United States. Pyongyang’s underlying security concerns mean that, no matter who else is involved, only a one-on-one deal with the United States will give the country’s leaders the assurances they need to stand down from the current state of nuclear tension.

Given the competing interests in how to deal with the current stalemate, and with Washington’s intent to let North Korea simmer on the back burner, a solution to the crisis is unlikely to come swiftly. And for Pyongyang, Beijing and Moscow -- albeit for different reasons -- that is not an entirely bad thing. As in 1993 , North Korea is patient and willing to wait Washington out. But given the deadly serious consideration of national survival, Pyongyang is likely to remain uncompromising in its position -- and until Washington is ready to sign a non-aggression pact, North Korea will continue its tiered brinksmanship, using its nuclear and missile programs as levers to force Washington’s capitulation.

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Date Added: Monday, January 13th, 2003
Contributed by: RCN Administrator