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The first war plan we considered, Operation Desert Stun, assumed that the United States would have almost no coalition support in the region outside of Turkey and very limited ground forces available. Under Desert Stun, the United States would have to carry out an intense, high-risk operation to achieve its war aims, using a plan built around a political decision by regional Iraqi commanders to cooperate with the United States. Were the political conversions not achieved, the United States would have to either abandon its plan or move to a follow-on plan.

Operation Desert Slice can be viewed as a follow-on plan to an unsatisfactory Desert Stun, a potential precursor operation to it or as a stand-alone plan. Desert Slice assumes that there would be some regional coalition support that would permit a limited basing of troops. In particular, it assumes at least Jordanian cooperation and possibly also cooperation from Kuwait. Desert Slice seeks to leverage this less-constrained environment to create a longer term, lower risk operation.

The operation’s goal would be to systematically degrade Iraqi control of the countryside without relying on the collaboration of Iraqi field commanders. Under this plan, Baghdad’s control over Iraq would methodically constrict until the regime would implode under external pressure. It would not require simultaneous, multi-front operations but would permit sequential, regional operations. This would allow for economy of force and create political opportunities in Baghdad in the course of the operations.

For the purpose of providing rough boundaries for theaters of operation, Iraq can be viewed as four geographic regions:

* The sparsely populated western region, whose eastward limits run from the Syrian border near Sinjar in the north to the Iraq-Kuwait-Saudi Arabia tri-border region in the south.
* The northern region, whose limits run on a line from As-Sulaymaniyah through Kirkuk and Mosul to the Syrian border.
* The southern region, centered around Basrah, and running northwest; its limits are on a line from Al-Amarah to An-Najaf, at the outer limits of the marshlands forming the Euphrates delta.
* The Baghdad region, running on a north-south axis, with its western limits on the lakes west of the city and its eastern limits in the fortifications along the Iranian frontier. Its northern extension would run from the tip of Buhayrat Ath Thartar to Tikrit (Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein’s hometown) to Khanaqin, near the Iranian frontier. The southern limit would run from near Al-Hillah and the ruins of ancient Babylon, through Al-Kut and Ali Al-Gharbi to the Iranian border. The region is crossed by multiple water barriers created by the Euphrates and Tigris rivers.

Desert Slice would focus on slicing off the three outlying regions -- western, northern and southern -- leaving the Baghdad region to whither on the vine. It would undoubtedly begin with the Phase I air campaign described in Operation Desert Stun scenario. Depending on logistical and political considerations, however, in Desert Slice it would be possible to sequence the Phase I attack in a more leisurely manner -- or even begin it after some ground operations had already commenced. But the critical point is that a Phase I air attack is not an indispensable enabler for this plan.

Any attempt to slice Iraq into segments risks an extreme Iraqi response. During Desert Storm, this response consisted of SCUD attacks against Israel and U.S. targets in Saudi Arabia. It must be assumed that the Iraqi SCUD capability has not subsided but actually has increased. Leaving aside for a moment the question of whether Iraq has nuclear weapons, let us presume that it has at least developed chemical agents that could be delivered by SCUD. This would necessitate capturing Western Iraq as a precursor to all other operations.

The United States does not want Israeli participation in a war with Iraq. Clearly SCUD attacks on Israel, particularly if they were more effective than in 1991, would trigger an Israeli response. Whether the United States wanted it or not, the perception in the Islamic and Arab worlds would be that the United States and Israel were jointly attacking Iraq. Desert Slice assumes a degree of cooperation from some of Iraq’s Arab neighbors; Israeli participation in the war, regardless of the provocation, would shatter an already thin coalition. Indeed, knowing this, Hussein would have every reason to use his SCUDs against Israel early, rather than later, in the campaign.

During Desert Storm in 1991, the special operations/air campaign against Iraqi SCUD sites proved unable to stop the attacks. Although there has been ten years of technical development, it is not clear whether this evolution favors the U.S. sensors or Iraqi camouflage and deception. Given the criticality of the mission, however, the United States could not afford to depend solely on air power to suppress the SCUDs.

Since Operation Desert Slice is built on a territorial constriction of Baghdad, it follows that the direct ground occupation of the region must be the first step. This seems to be in line with Iraq’s deployment of forces. In general, the Iraqis appear to have layered their forces so that the most capable formations are deployed near Baghdad while their less capable forces are forward deployed. There are sound military reasons for this. Hussein does not intend to fight the decisive battle in the open where U.S. mobility and air superiority can be most effective. He will prefer to fight in urbanized areas, where these factors can be negated and where the United States will be fighting on extended lines of supply. The further his forces are from Baghdad, the thinner and weaker they become.

The Iraqi deployment reinforces the logic of Operation Desert Slice. An attack in the western region not only would decrease the risk to Israel and thus increase the stability of the coalition but also would be initially against the weakest Iraqi deployments. Taking control of the western region would require a relatively small deployment of U.S. forces. For example, if the marine force that recently trained in Jordan were reinforced with some Special Operations assets and some additional Army light infantry, it would represent a substantial capability that could take, hold and patrol the region. If Iraqi armored formations located west of Baghdad moved against these troops, the United States would have an opportunity to use air power in an environment where advanced air defenses would already have been eliminated.

The second phase of the attack in the northern region would pose some challenges. The Turkish-Iraqi frontier is extremely rugged with only tracks running through most of the region. The single effective road, the road to Mosul, is in the extreme west and runs along the Syrian-Turkish border for quite a distance. Indeed, the most rational axis of attack from Turkey into Iraq runs through Syria.

Fortunately for the Americans, the Turks have developed extensive experience and capabilities in cross-border operations into Iraq. Their forces have on a number of occasions penetrated deep into Iraq and remained there. This is due partly to the Turks’ own capabilities and partly to cooperation with the Kurds. However, Kurdish cooperation is a sensitive issue as the Kurds want to form their own state. The Turks do not want to hear about a Kurdish state. Getting the two sides to cooperate is complex, but, nevertheless, an attack is possible.

Unlike western Iraq, which is lightly defended, northern Iraq does contain some Iraqi forces. According to The New York Times, the northernmost formations, comprising the Iraqi 5th Corps, consist of a Republican Guard mechanized division and four regular army divisions (one mechanized and three infantry). All are based west of the Kurdish region in the mountainous northeast, centered around Mosul. Southeast of the 5th Corps is the 1st Corps around Kirkuk, consisting of a Republican Guard infantry division, a regular army mechanized division and two army infantry divisions.

This appears to be a large formation that would be susceptible to U.S. tactical air power based in Turkey. Therefore, we would expect that immediately after, or even in conjunction with, the attack on western Iraq, the United States would begin a counterforce air campaign in the north. This campaign, accompanied by Special Forces targeting, would aim at disorganizing the Iraqi rear. If Turkish and/or Kurdish forces could be induced to bear the burden of the ground war, an air campaign of a few weeks’ duration would culminate in a ground campaign that could secure the perimeters of the region, if not pacify it.

This would leave the most difficult piece of Operation Desert Slice, the southern piece. The United States would have two ways to approach this problem. If the Kuwaitis permitted the Americans to use their territory for an attack on Iraq, an attack northward would be possible. It should be noted that the terrain in this region is not ideal for mobile operations. The western portion of the Kuwait-Iraqi border is suitable terrain, but the eastern portion, particularly the road to Basrah, runs through intensely marshy terrain. Indeed, even a direct northward thrust would end up in the marshes. The operation would need to run north along a few roads paralleling the Shatt al Arab.

On the other hand, the region is lightly held. The 3rd Corps, in the south, consists of three regular army divisions while the 4th Corps, along the Nasiriyah-Amarah line, also has three army divisions. However, in this terrain, a determined infantry force could be effective. A simple ground attack north out of Kuwait would not by itself suffice.

Apart from the obvious need for air power, using anti-personnel munitions, there is a real requirement for amphibious forces. If the coastal defenses could be suppressed by air power and special operations, a marine amphibious force heavily equipped with Light Armored Vehicles and helicopters could assault the region and impose a rapid mobile operation on the Iraqis in spite of the terrain. A marine amphibious assault, supported by a mechanized army force operating out of Kuwait, would slice off the final piece.

This, of course, leaves Baghdad. None of the forces deployed in the plan thus far could possibly approach Baghdad unless there were a full capitulation. Even a general disintegration of Iraq’s command and control would leave open the possibility of resistance by some forces. Due to the force multipliers of river lines and urbanization, even a relatively small number of enemy forces could generate larger numbers of casualties than the attacking forces could handle.

On the other hand, Operation Desert Slice would leave Baghdad in a potential crisis. Cut off from food supplies, clearly unable to regain lost territory, subject to constant air attack, even Hussein’s highly capable security apparatus would be pressed to the breaking point. The United States would now have the luxury of time and could increase its force and logistical capability in Iraq systematically. Using this additional force, it could systematically tighten the noose around the city without having to enter it. Obviously, this poses a serious political challenge, because if encirclement turns into siege and Hussein doesn’t capitulate, the limits on the U.S. ability to wage siege warfare are obvious.

The weakness with Desert Slice, as with Desert Stun, is the end game. However, unlike Desert Stun, Desert Slice yields substantial territorial gains. It is a lower risk operation. It is also an operation fully compatible with Desert Stun, since regional military leaders have the same inducement to switch sides while the psychological pressure on the rump Baghdad region could induce others to switch sides, too.

Desert Slice does have an overwhelming potential weakness. The entire plan is built around the assumption that (a) Hussein’s forces are incapable of mounting an offensive or that (b) any offensive will be managed with air power. If those assumptions prove false, then U.S. forces would be on the ground in insufficient numbers to resist a determined ground attack. By the numbers, Hussein should be able to beat the thin forces used in Desert Slice. The fundamental assumption is that the numbers don’t mean anything, that Hussein’s force is qualitatively incapable of effective action.

If that premise proves false, Desert Slice could turn into "Desert Slaughter." In Desert Storm, the principle was to consistently overestimate Iraq’s military on the premise that one can never go wrong overestimating an enemy and overmatching his force. Desert Slice is driven by the limits of the coalition and the inability to bring overwhelming power to bear. It assumes, therefore, that the power that is available will be sufficient. In one sense, this makes Desert Slice even more risky than Desert Stun. In Desert Stun, the failure of the air campaign left relatively few U.S. forces exposed on the ground. In Desert Slice, there would be enough forces on the ground to generate a bloody defeat.

There is, therefore, an even more conservative plan, Desert Storm II.

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INDONESIA: POSSIBLE U.S. PRESSURE TACTICS MAY BACKFIRE

Date Added: Wednesday, September 11th, 2002
Contributed by: RCN Administrator